In contemporary philosophy of mind, few topics generate as much tension and debate as the nature of the self and consciousness. In a wide-ranging conversation, philosophers Charles Taliaferro, Stewart Goetz, and host Pat Flynn explore a range of top issues in philosophy in the latest Mind Matters News podcast. They include the challenges posed by reductive materialism, the coherence of substance dualism, and the metaphysical implications of rejecting the enduring self. They provide a robust defense of substance dualism — the mind is not at all like the brain — grounded in moral, epistemic, and existential common sense.

Is the self only a momentary thing?

The dialogue begins by questioning the idea — entertained by some contemporary philosophers — that the self might be momentary or substitutable. Could one person begin to hear a sentence while another finishes it? Could a new “self” emerge every few minutes? These scenarios, while intellectually provocative, border on science fiction and become ethically and existentially absurd. Without an enduring self, concepts like responsibility, memory, and identity collapse. As Flynn quips, if he isn’t the same person who made a promise ten minutes ago, why should he be held to it?

Taliaferro criticizes the philosophical fashion of embracing increasingly outrageous metaphysical positions just to stand out. While pushing boundaries can be fruitful suggest, it also invites unnecessary absurdities. Analytical philosopher Galen Strawson, for instance, once argued for four-minute selves but eventually abandoned the view. The conversation contends that the enduring self is far more than an intuitive notion — it’s a necessary one.

We are all substance dualists at heart

Goetz argues that substance dualism is not just a fringe belief. In fact, most introductory philosophy of mind texts begin with dualism because it aligns with our lived experience: we understand ourselves as selves distinct from our bodies. Critics of dualism often concede its intuitive power before trying to dismantle it with reductive accounts.

Yet their dismissals often rely on shallow arguments. Taliaferro recalls a professor who refuted dualism by citing alcohol-induced unconsciousness. But this putdown misses the point. The mind-body connection is real, and interaction is undeniable — but this doesn’t reduce one to the other. We eat, plan, love, and reason based on the belief that our minds cause actions in the physical world. To live otherwise would be impossible.

When science is seen as the only source of knowledge…

Pat Flynn introduces the work of philosopher Alex Rosenberg as a case study in eliminative materialism. Rosenberg accepts every bizarre consequence of his view, including the claim that there is no enduring self, no meaning, and no reason for his own writings. While intellectually consistent, this position is existentially bankrupt. Goetz appreciates Rosenberg’s honesty, arguing that such thinkers inadvertently help dualists by illustrating the extreme costs of rejecting the mind.

The broader issue is scientism — the belief that science alone provides legitimate knowledge. Naturalists, according to Flynn, often claim their worldview is more parsimonious because it avoids extra metaphysical commitments like souls or gods. But as they reintroduce mental properties, intentionality, and values under different names, their theories become bloated and ad hoc. In short, they’re left with all the commitments of dualism, but without its coherence.

But how does the mind affect the body?

Goetz and Taliaferro address one of the most popular objections to dualism: the problem of causal interaction. If the mind is non-physical, how can it affect the physical body? This is where science, they argue, is misused. The assumption of causal closure is a methodological tool in experimental settings, not a universal metaphysical truth. You can believe in local causal closure for scientific purposes while denying that the physical world is causally closed in every respect.

Moreover, science itself presupposes mental causation. Scientists form hypotheses, interpret data, and act with purpose. These activities cannot be reduced to neural firings without undermining science itself. If mind is illusion, so too is the scientific enterprise.

Dennett, Dualism, and the Middle Ground

Taliaferro also critiques the work of well-known philosopher Daniel Dennett (1942–2024). While Dennett wants to deny the self, he still talks about reasoning, experience, and meaning. This double-speak ultimately fails. If there is no self, who reasons? If qualia don’t exist, what are we explaining?

Attempts at a middle ground, such as “liberal naturalism,” are equally suspect. These views smuggle in mental properties, free will, and normativity while claiming allegiance to naturalism. As Flynn argues, they eventually face the same metaphysical costs as dualism, but without its clarity or tradition.

A call for intellectual honesty

The philosophers ended the discussion on a note of cautious appreciation for thinkers like Rosenberg and Dennett. While their conclusions are troubling, at least they are consistent. Taliaferro and Goetz argue that the enduring self, mental causation, and moral responsibility are not optional philosophical add-ons — they are foundational. Without them, science, ethics, and even our ordinary experience unravel.

Substance dualism may not be fashionable, but it remains a coherent, intuitively plausible, and philosophically resilient position. As the conversation makes clear, any worldview that denies the self must pay a steep price — one that most people, intuitively and existentially, are not prepared to accept.