When I first read the title of a recent article at New Scientist, “What 350 different theories of consciousness reveal about reality,” my first thought was to ask physicist Rob Sheldon a question: “Is consciousness really suited to be a subject for science if there are 350 different theories?”

He wrote back, “I wouldn’t say that it is not suited. I would say that the problem is not well-defined. If we don’t have the definition right, then our theories don’t have a chance. Sort of like theories of phlogiston or ether.”

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The author of the article is Robert Lawrence Kuhn, host of Closer to Truth. He has hosted proponents of many such theories on his highly regarded podcast, so we can probably learn a lot even if we don’t get very close to understanding consciousness.

Kuhn makes clear that the stakes are high:

From materialism, where only physical states are real, to idealism, where only mental states are real – and everything in between – it will become apparent, as we wander through these heady fields, how much is at stake. That’s because whichever theory of consciousness you favour determines many of your core beliefs about the world, such as your opinions on the nature of free will, the possibility of life after death and whether artificial intelligence can attain consciousness.

“What 350 different theories of consciousness reveal about reality,” October 22, 2025. Kuhn has also authored an open access paper at Science on the landscape of consciousness theories.

The usual response is a claim that someday we will figure it out while continuing to use materialist assumptions. For example, Anil Seth and Tim Bayne comment at Nature Reviews Neuroscience,

However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries. (from the Abstract)

Seth, A.K., Bayne, T. Theories of consciousness. Nat Rev Neurosci 23, 439–452 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4

The researchers are not really under any pressure to resolve the consciousness conundrum; just to come up with new (materialist) theories about it.