

The Unique Relationship Between Consciousness and Its Bearer

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Robert J. Marks:

Greetings and welcome to Mind Matters News. I'm your conscious co-host, Robert J. Marks. My fellow co-host is Dr. Angus Menuge, who is chair of the philosophy department at Concordia University in Wisconsin. We're chatting with Dr. Mihretu Guta who teaches analytic philosophy at Biola University about his chapter in what sense is Consciousness of Property. This is a chapter in *Minding the Brain*, a book which is edited by Dr. Menuge, Brian Krouse, and yours truly. For more information about the book and Dr. Guta's chapter, visit mindingthebrain.org. That's mindingthebrain.org. We're going to continue our conversation with Dr. Guta. And with that, let me give the floor to Dr. Menuge. Angus?

Angus Menuge:

All right, thank you. So we looked already at the amazing nature of consciousness and how it really doesn't reduce to anything physical. And some would view this in terms of David Chalmers famous hard problem of consciousness, namely that none of our physical sciences explain or predict that there's something it's like to be us. And yet there is. But in a way, your chapter I think raises what might be called an even harder problem of consciousness, and that is that we have to ask what kind of being, what kind of entity must exist in order for consciousness to exist. And you argued that consciousness seems to be unique and requiring a bearer. Exactly what is it that you are claiming there and why does that show that consciousness is a very unique property?

Mihretu Guta:

Yeah, this is a very good question, and I think what I mean by consciousness requiring a bearer as something that's based on my fundamental metaphysical assumption with respect to the nature of consciousness, because consciousness is necessarily a phenomenon that cannot exist unless it is borne by a certain kind of entity. Here's a very straightforward example for people to see my point. Take for example, perception. I can talk about perception without a perceiver.

Or let's talk about thinking without a thinker. How does that work? Let's do this experiment together. So David Hume and the *Treatise of Human Nature* in one of the books in that volume, it postulates that individual existence like perceptions can't exist without having a bearer. That's a very extraordinary claim. While I was doing my PhD, I just couldn't make sense of that. In one sense, I couldn't make sense of that, where the English is clear, the statement is clear, the metaphysics is not clear, the ontology is not clear. So I just couldn't bring myself into saying, oh, I nod my head. I can understand. Oh, perception is out there. Wow, wow. Perception one is bigger than perception two, but we're saying that literally without a perceiver. What does that actually mean? So that doesn't really make sense because we can't make sense of perception in abstraction from a perceiver.

So if perception necessitates perceiver, there's no sense in which we can actually divorce perception from perceiver because perception as a phenomenon can exist because there is a perceiver. Thinking as a phenomenon, mental phenomenon can exist because of a thinker. So once you dissociate the two, you've lost the game because there's no thinking. They cannot be perception, in my view. Hence, in the same fashion, if consciousness is thoroughly subjective experience is person dependent in an ontological sense of the term. If we cannot separate perception from perceiver, thinking from a thinker, we cannot in the same fashion using the same logic, we cannot divorce consciousness, that subjective experience from a person who is or from an entity who is metaphysically necessary for that experience to happen

or to take place. So the better model is now bringing into the picture what many philosophers have actually have ignored for years.

This doesn't include J. P. Moreland. J. P. Moreland have argued more or less to the same conclusion. But I'm bringing this to the forefront of our awareness. Look, when we debate and discuss about consciousness, let us not try consciousness as if consciousness can exist in its own independent island where we can actually look at it and treat it as if it's just an entity in its own right. No. Look, to crack the mystery of consciousness, the nature of consciousness, we should be able to also crack the mystery of his bearer. That is what makes it to be harder. David Chalmers only talks about the hard problem of consciousness. Well, he is not concerned about its bearer. He doesn't postulate about the bearer of consciousness, by the way. He doesn't even write about that. He never wrote anything explicitly. I had actually a face-to-face conversation with Chalmers at the University of Arizona, not once, two, three times.

And he said, yeah, he doesn't really include... He never included those kinds of things in his writings. So we can take Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness, we can strengthen, in fact increase the pressure on that problem. That's what I'm doing. By bringing into the picture, we not only have to talk about the problem of consciousness, we also have to talk about the bearer, the bearer of consciousness, because consciousness literally cannot exist without its bearer. Just like perception cannot exist without a perceiver, thinking cannot exist without a thinker. The same logic works here. If anyone really thinks otherwise, I would like to see anyone to convince me that thinking can exist without a thinker and perception can exist without a perceiver. If I don't get satisfactory answer, then I am going to stick to my guts here. So sorry. That's what I mean.

Angus Menuge:

That's very helpful. And this bearer dependent nature of consciousness. Race is a crisis for how you can locate the property of consciousness in any of the standard views of properties. For example, if someone is a Platonist, what's the problem if you give a Platonist account of consciousness?

Mihretu Guta:

Excellent. So to see this problem, first, let's talk about very briefly how Platonists view properties. So properties for Platonists, they are universals. Universals are properties that are say to exist in multiple locations, but as numerically one property. Let me explain this. Take for example, 20 red cars in 20 different states here in United States. Each car is red, occupying different locations in United States, in 20 different states. The ancients asked, ancient philosophers asked, how many rednesses do we have here? One redness, numerically one redness shared by 10 different or 20 different cars in 20 different states, or each car in all of these states has its own redness, token redness, or redness that's not shareable with another redness of the car that's in another state. So here are two questions. Okay. Is redness numerically one shared by multiple objects or multiple objects are instantiating their own mini rednesses?

So if you take Platonist answer, note, there is one numerically one redness shared by multiple objects, but the redness can exist even if objects didn't instantiate it, didn't exemplify it. So if you apply this logic directly to consciousness, it means literally consciousness is out there, some in Platonic universe. And your consciousness, my consciousness, Bob's consciousness, Austin's consciousness is a token and instantiation of that universal type. We philosophers talk about type versus token. Type is in universal, token is a single specific instantiation of that single universal or type. So that doesn't make sense to me because I don't think there is consciousness out there in the Platonic universe where I'm exemplifying

that consciousness and someone is also doing likewise. But there is some complexity here. Well, we can say that the property of being conscious is a property that's shared by all of us universally.

Okay. Four of us here in this interview session, each one of us shares the property of being conscious. That's fine, that's fine. But we're not taking that the property of being conscious as a universal here, each one of us is literally numerically sharing one universal called being conscious. That's not what we mean. I think this needs a little bit of filleting out, but the point is it opens a door. Platonist model opens a door for the existence of consciousness, whether or not it is instantiated by us. So it's independently existing thing. Well, the problem is my definition of consciousness is subjective experience is how things look to me. It's specific. It's dependent on me. It's not something existing in abstraction from what I'm experiencing. That's not the kind of consciousness that we are talking about here. So it's totally attached to me and it defines my nature. So I don't know if this makes sense, but it's a bit complicated stuff, but I hope that makes sense.

Angus Menuge:

Yeah, I mean because they can't be consciousness that's generic. That's no one's consciousness. And each person's consciousness is unique, so we don't have this identity that you would have any example of the redness where each of those could be identical. So that really is a problem. And you say as well that even the Aristotelian account, which perhaps is better in some ways still faces a problem. You say that it doesn't tell us how subjectivity is connected to the property of being conscious. What's the problem, even with the Aristotelian account?

Mihretu Guta:

Okay, with that Aristotelian approach, actually the problem is literally shifting the platform of the problem. I haven't used this term in my chapter, but I think that's exactly what's happening. The reason is Aristotelians and Platonists, they do not disagree over whether or not properties are universals. They do agree, they have a common convergence point there. Aristotelian say, yeah, universals exist, properties are universals. They can be shared by multiple objects and so on. And redness, a single numerical redness can be shared by any number of things for Aristotelians, the same thing is true for Platonists. The problem that Aristotelians see in the Platonist model is that in the Platonist model, uninstantiated properties also can exist. You see, properties don't have to be exemplified to exist. Aristotelians reject that. Aristotelians will say, objects, wherever they are and so far as they are red, they are simply instantiating one, numerically one redness.

So Aristotelians domesticated the platform where properties get and instantiated. The problem that we face is exactly the same kind of problem that we face when I talked about the Platonist model. If we adopt Aristotelian model, all of us are instantiating literally numerically the same property called being conscious. Well, this is going to conflict with our own individual experiences, individual subjective and shareable, personal relative, person dependent, host of experiences. Again, we go back to the headache stuff. Well I guess your headache, Bob's headache, Austin's headache, my headache given for example, the Aristotelian model is exactly numerically the same. Numerically the same.

But the only difference is you are over there, I am over here, someone is over there, someone is over there, but we all are having one tight headache, but we are demonstrating our own token headache. I have a token headache of that one headache. Everyone, Bob has a token headache, that one headache, a bigger headache. And the same thing is true. That's not what consciousness is all about. Conscious experience doesn't work that way. I'm sorry. So the experience goes against that kind of analysis. Therefore, it is highly problematic. And there are other things, but this is the main conundrum that we run into even when we take up like that Aristotelian model.

Angus Menuge:

Now, of course, there are philosophers who deny universals altogether Nominalists, and though we can't talk about all of them, probably the most popular approach in nominalism today is trope theory. Could you just explain trope theory briefly? And also then even that really doesn't solve this problem. It doesn't do justice to the nature of consciousness.

Mihretu Guta:

Excellent point. So trope ontology or modern nominalism, as some philosophers call it, trope ontology is highly advanced, the discussion in this area, but here is right to the point without getting into a jungle. Trope ontology is called a one category ontology. It does not recognize that there's a distinction between a property and a certain kind of object that instantaneous that particular property. For example, take an apple. An apple is an object. If an apple is red, then we are witnessing, let's say two properties here, even three properties. An apple has a size, let's say it could be big or small, and an apple is red, that is the color property, and apple is a spherical, that's a shape property. So a shape property, a size property, and a color property, all of those make up for trope ontology what we call an object, apple. So there are no two different categories.

An apple being an object doesn't belong to the category of let's say particulars. Philosophers say objects or particulars. And its color property doesn't belong to the property of universals. For trope ontology, these properties literally congregate. They come together and make up an object. So the common togetherness of the size property, the shape property, the color property give rise to object that we call an apple. So what just happened here? So we don't have two categories or three categories, for example, we have only one category. So within that one category, the magic happens. So if that's the case, fundamentally, it goes against my model. Why? The bearer defendant model doesn't really work here. Because the bearer's defendant model actually distinguishes the distinction between the bearer, ontologically having its own category and the property it bears. The property has its own ontological category. Aristotle actually has a fine model, but we can't really discuss about him. So trope ontology, one of the problems, significant problems is inability.

Inability to distinguish consciousness in its bearer on the ontological level. Yeah, I think defenders of this view say, no, we're not doing that, but they are doing that because it's a one category ontology. But I don't believe in one category ontology because it's a category mistake. I have no idea how an object is accumulative effect of different kinds of properties coming together congregating. What is congregating them? What is the glue that glues them all as one object? How's that happening? Nobody has a clue. But defenders of this position say it's simpler theory. I have a big problem when it comes to simplicity. We cannot establish a simplicity principle and then judge the quality of theories. What should really dictate our judgment of any theory is whether or not it is in sync with the way things are or not. So it's reality that should really determine what kind of principle we should be using in order to judge that. So the problem is the denial of the bearer, distinct better of consciousness among many other problems, if that makes sense.

Angus Menuge:

Yeah, that's very helpful. Now of course, you mentioned this in the chapter, you've got some versions of Buddhism which deny the self, and of course you've also got Hume's view where he claims that you can understand consciousness without a bearer. And you spoke of that earlier, and perhaps I could read just an excerpt from what Hume says about that, and I'd like you to comment on this. He famously says, for my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other. I never catch myself at any time without a perception and can never observe

anything but the perception and so concludes that we are just bundles of perceptions that there can be consciousness without a bearer. What exactly is it that you think is incoherent about Hume's position?

Mihretu Guta:

Okay. This passage has been honestly exhausted by many countless philosophers over the years. Right there on that passage, Hume is automatically presupposing, but then at the same time, giving God an impression that he was not aware of what he is doing. He is saying, I have been looking. I have been looking into my core being, and then I did not run into let's say the solve and so on. Well, what has he been doing? Who has been looking into his own core being? Who has been searching for, let's say, the solve for something like that? This is the entity. He has already distinguished. He has already admitted without being aware of what he was doing, that there is a fundamental distinction between a person who has been searching for something and perceptions that are totally mental and so on. So he has given us a wonderful account of perception is real, this is real, that is real. And then he was distinct.

He was aware of those things. So that's an entity. So he admitted that he was an entity, but he was not aware of the implication of his own statements. It is problematic because if I were to say to you guys, as I say it earlier, well, I cannot speak a word of English or let's take for example, the logical positivist claim that any statement, unless it's empirically verifiable or verified, it cannot count as genuine knowledge. Well, okay, we know how things went really, really bad and wrong for that view because philosophers came along and said to logical positivism of the 1930s and 40's. Well, okay, what exactly justifies the very statement that says that unless X is empirically verifiable, then X doesn't count as a reliable body of knowledge? You can't shove in that statement in any laboratory and test it and then wait, what kind of output you'll get as the end of doing that. So it's self-defeating, self-contradictory and it undermines its own claim.

I do believe personally, David Hume's claims literally undermine themselves because he has been searching for a solve. Then there is an entity right there. So he's a bundle theorist. He says that only bundles exist. Bundles are universals, but they have to come together somehow in making up objects in our world. There are certain examples in physics, but we don't have time to talk about that. But you see, I think Angus, I think this is clear. Look, there's a caveat here. Many philosophers want to rescue Hume here. They want to put things in his mouth and they want to rescue the implications of this passage. I think to be absolutely honest, it is incoherent because he is undermining his own assumptions because he already presupposed, him being distinct from what he has been searching for. I don't know if that makes sense.

Angus Menuge:

Yeah, no, that does. And I've noticed too that he has multiple bouts of introspection. What is it that is able to compare these? If you really were a bundle, then there would be nothing which would be able to compare one bout of introspection with another. And of course, the thing that's doing it is the eye that he keeps himself referring to. So I think you're right, it is an incoherent position. Now what about others? When we're thinking about what explains the emergence of the bearer and you describe your view as a form of strong emergence. There are some Nancy Murphy, and probably it's probably a majority view, is that somehow it's just the complexity of the brain somehow because of the hundred billion neurons and all of the amazing synaptic connections, if you have a system that complicated, well, consciousness is the kind of thing that's just going to emerge, and you disagree. You don't think that complexity is the right place to look for an explanation. Can you explain?

Mihretu Guta:

Yeah, absolutely. Colin McGinn, a British philosopher, has got excellent book where he, in my view, successfully dismantles this kind of assumption and hope on complexity and causing such a complex phenomenon as consciousness. So if you take complexity, if complexity literally plays a causal role in bringing about the existence of consciousness, then we need to first do the metaphysical hard work. What exactly is the property of complexity such that in light of or in virtue of that property, the complexity in question ends up causing the phenomenon that we call consciousness? So as far as up to now, up to now, people who appeal to complexity, they are literally talking about complexity, not because they have any evidence whatsoever. So let's suppose, let's relate this to Bob's field, computer science. So make a computer as complex as you want. So a ChatGPT, for example, the four or the four zero model or four O. For a micron or omnipotent, something like model that came out recently.

So make it as complex as you want. It's just not obvious that complexity would do the magic here because nervous system is extremely complicated, but the complexity is often talked about from the physical standpoint. Philosophers always like are ignorant of the functional complexity. So there's a functional complexity, the physical complexity, the networks, the circuits that you see, the neurons, how they're connected, blah, blah, blah. Take the functional complexity. The functional complexity is a cognitive phenomenon that would really require a high level of analysis here. So if complexity is causing consciousness, how is it causing consciousness? Where does this consciousness coming from? So if you take embryology, human embryology, you have a woman gamete, a male gamete, and when they are united through procreative means you have cells that coagulate, they come together and then they just start differentiating themselves. Structures emerge, complexity emerge, organ specialization emerges.

Liver cells specialize as liver cells, heart cells specialize as heart cells and so on and so forth. Look, nowhere in its initial or in subsequent stages, we have no idea whatsoever where this phenomenon actually comes from. Nothing. We simply witness when it manifests itself. So if complexity were something that actually did this kind of magic to happen, then we would be in a position at this point given our current neuro scientific knowledge, at least to get some insights into how this phenomenon actually emerged from brain complexity. It is my conclusion. It is literally nothing more than pronouncing. It's a hope. It's a hypothesis unconfirmed even to a lesser degree. So there's absolutely no good reason for us to take it seriously because it's just saying, oh, complexity did it. We don't know how it did it.

Let's keep on doing this research and at some point we'll get there. Even to get there, we haven't been given even clear explanations about the nature of this hypothesis and how the hypothesis is supposed to work. So I am not sold into it, and I think there are so many philosophers who are skeptical of the complexity because we haven't been taught about the nature of this complexity, the property of this complexity, because when we appeal to complexity, we are appealing to causal process. So what is the property that really endowed this complexity to be able to do that? I would like to hear if anyone has an answer to that question.

Angus Menuge:

Well, that's very helpful. I mean, and certainly it's clear that we can have very complex systems, the entire universe for example, or the internet, and there's no reason unless you're a panpsychist, to think that either of them is conscious and though the gap seems to be, as you suggest, it's a qualitative gap, nothing about mere complexity of external relations has anything to do with what you say in the last part of your chapter that what's really extraordinary about consciousness is "It cannot be shared by more than one individual or exist uninstantiated." Whereas of course, anything physical, it could be a computer chip or a neuron in someone's brain. Well, that can certainly, you could take that chip or neuron and put it in another system and it'd be just the same thing. So exactly what's so important about this unshareability of consciousness and the fact that it cannot exist uninstantiated?

Mihretu Guta:

So it cannot exist uninstantiated, because when we talk about the phenomenon of consciousness, we are literally talking thoroughly about subjective experience or experiences. So to say that these experiences can exist without me, for example, is like saying my headache can exist without me, my pain can exist without me. My test experience, let's say testing coffee, testing ice cream or testing smoothies or sound like that, that test can exist without me is really, really a meaningless statement. Let me bring in John Locke here. John Locke has this what he primary qualities and secondary qualities. So for John Locke, primary qualities are out there, trees are out there, objects are out there, anyone can access them, scientists can really investigate their investigation and so on and so forth. But he is entirely not only unsure, he doesn't think that secondary qualities actually can be detected in primary qualities.

What this means is that in a nutshell, tech my test buds. Okay. I enjoy coffee, so I'm a very big coffee drinker. I don't know whether this is because coffee was discovered in Ethiopia for the first time. I don't know. But I started drinking coffee when I was at college and so on and so forth. But ever since I just became a coffee drinker. So look, if you bring any medical expert, let's say doctor, to assess and examine my test buds to its micro level, to the level of even dissecting quarks or even go down even beyond quarks if you like, do you think that doctor or scientists can come up with any understanding of how coffee tastes like for me? No. How a smoothie tastes like for me? No. So my sense do not have any experience of testing a smoothie or coffee or something like that, but I know what it feels like for me to have a test of a smoothie or coffee or juice or something like that.

So there's a deep mystery right here. So we have a physical infrastructure in place my test buds. Experts can analyze the nature of these cells, how they are integrated and how they behave, what their properties are and so on. But having that exhaustive knowledge is literally is not going to produce no information about my subjective aspect of experience, let's say my test experience, my head experience, and so on. So this is the conundrum that we're literally in. This is the confusing part of this experience. My test buds are there to be studied. They can't be studied by anyone, they can't be understood by anyone, but you are lacking the secondary qualities. So I have to test that, but let me shock you guys, but I'm not against people who... expert testers of coffee or other beverages or something like that. Technically speaking, they're not experts. Okay. Their expertise wouldn't represent my experience.

So if you are a world-class coffee tester, let's say, I'm not going to come at your livelihood, go ahead and make money that you make. I'm happy for you. But why should I trust your judgment of how that coffee tastes and then concur with you, that's exactly the way it's going to test for me? Can I do that? No. Mine is unique to me and yours is unique. It's how things really feel like when you test them, this kind of thing. So I think I would say that there's a really, really deep mystery here. I don't think we can narrow this gulf and gut that easily. And so the primary and the secondary qualities, they work in tandem, but then they are not like each other. No amount of our knowledge of primary quality is being produce any significant knowledge of our experience of secondary qualities. That's exactly why consciousness is unshareable. Any given two people cannot have the same kind of subjective experience. It's just not possible. It's not possible in a sense that the reality is such that we don't see that happening. How about that?

Angus Menuge:

That's very good.

Robert J. Marks:

Well, what's interesting about this too is that in the United States Patent office, you cannot patent a smell or a taste because it's not something that can be tested. And they, going back to your idea of

complexity in the area of artificial intelligence, the reason they believe that consciousness is going to emerge is that there is the underlying assumption that we are computers made out of meat, and therefore if we're computers made out of meat, you count the neurons in the human brain, you count the neurons in a artificial neural network, and when they are roughly the same, you say, voila, we must have consciousness emerge. George Gilder, I love this statement. George Gilder, who is one of the founders of Discovery Institute calls this idea of emergence of consciousness from complexity, rapture of the nerds. Indeed, this is what it is. It's a faith and it's a religion. So that's interesting.

Mihretu Guta:

Even to add to that briefly. For example, Bob, you're a computer expert and what exactly is like... Where do you guys create blood proteins and water? What are we comparing? Okay. In our case, our biology in its all aspects is unlike the complexity of any computer ever invented.

Robert J. Marks:

Oh, absolutely.

Mihretu Guta:

So when we compare to objects, at least we need to have a common platform where we can say we share this and that and that. I think my own judgment, I'm teaching the philosophy of artificial intelligence at Biola. Of course, I introduced a graduate level course.

Robert J. Marks:

I would be very interested in the material you're using. Let's talk offline and I'd like to see what you're talking about. Okay, go ahead.

Mihretu Guta:

Exactly. So what are we comparing with what? Because look, the gadgets that we are inventing, it took us, it took our knowledge, our creativity, our ontological nature to be able to produce them, to invent them. So for us to be able to appreciate our gadgets in the sense of them being superior to us or a day will come when they will be superior to us is literally ontologically, it doesn't really make sense to me because there is unbridgeable ontological gap between us and artifacts that we create because we are their gods, with a small G. It took us. So no sense can be made of any complex artificial intelligence can be compared with our natural intelligence.

Having said that, I think this issue should be taken very, very seriously because I'm really struggling what the basis of the comparison is. If you have invented these objects, you've already ontologically, your superiority to these devices is literally sealed up ontologically, so there's nothing you can do about it. And also, if consciousness can be created in a machine, what exactly is consciousness? We haven't solved this question. We haven't tackled this question. So if we are claiming that we can create consciousness, conscious machines and so on without even tackling a fundamental question of what consciousness is, what are we actually doing and what are we really talking about? First, you have to understand X in order to be able to reproduce X. Here is my judgment, and I'll stop with this.

Robert J. Marks:

I like it.

Mihretu Guta:

Bob, you can correct me. You can correct me. Everything artificial intelligence has achieved up to this point doesn't go beyond simulation.

Robert J. Marks:

Oh yeah, absolutely. In fact, Noam Chomsky called this ChatGPT a digital plagiarism, and so yeah, it's just spitting out what it's been taught.

Angus Menuge:

So wrapping this up, I think that what's great about your approach, Mihretu, the great takeaway lesson is this, that we need to resolutely investigate consciousness on its own terms. In other words, just try to understand it as it is given to us and not try to force it into any preconceived scheme, whether it be AI or any particular view of properties that works elsewhere, because there really is something unique about it. It reminds me in a way of how the Church Fathers finally realized the Aristotelian metaphysics was not up to explaining the persons of the Trinity. You just have to investigate the Trinity on its own terms. So if you are right about approaching consciousness in this way, what would your advice be for subsequent research? What should people be focusing on? What's maybe not going to be helpful if we're going to make progress along the lines that you recommend?

Mihretu Guta:

There are so many things that I say here, but let me say briefly the following things. First of all, it takes us back to what we have been saying at the beginning of this talk. We need to open ourselves up to embrace first-order approach and second-order approach. So there's a sort of tribalism going on between sometimes between philosophers and scientists and so on. So scientists think that empirical approach is always more qualified than the non-empirical approach in understanding the nature of something, let's say consciousness in this case, I think we need to breach that gap. That's not going to be helpful. I think we've already talked about how our knowledge of anything in this world almost is going to be partial, even if we combine the two approaches. But combining the two approaches will always give us a very good shot at what we're doing in terms of helping us to succeed to some extent.

I think I would like to say scientists and philosophers, really, they have to work together. They have to have conviction that philosophical infrastructure is really, really important for the progress that we are always striving to see in the scientific domain. I think that's one thing that I would like to highly recommend because otherwise, we are really talking in our own little cubicles. Philosophers produce models after models and scientists produce models after models. It's just not clear honestly what to make off all this diverse, mutually exclusive, sometimes highly like contradictory, sometimes models. Let's open ourselves up. We are in this one universe. Here is a best opportunity. Let's do our best. That's my recommendation for pragmatic reasons. Anything else, Angus?

Angus Menuge:

No, that's really a great way to summarize the approach, and I think it's very inspiring. I think that if we focus on consciousness being one phenomenon and we recognize these different approaches that the best way for progress to occur is if we respect the insights that come from a variety of disciplines. That's really what the whole Minding the Brain project was all about, and I think that's really an excellent takeaway message.

Robert J. Marks:

That's great. Thank you, Mihretu. This has been a great time and I've learned a lot and this has been very instructive, so thank you. Angus Menuge and I have been talking with Dr. Mihretu Guta who teaches analytic philosophy at Biola University. We've been talking about his chapter, in what sense is consciousness a property? This is a chapter in *Minding The Brain*. For more information about the book and to read Dr. Guta's chapter, visit mindingthebrain.org. That's mindingthebrain.org. I'm your co-host, Robert J. Marks. Until next time, be of good cheer.

Announcer:

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