

Philosophies of Mind: Jim Madden on Hylomorphism and Neuroscience

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Announcer:

Greetings, and welcome to Mind Matters News. Continuing our coverage of the new book, *Minding the Brain* by Angus Menuge, Robert Marks and Brian Krouse, we have Pat Flynn joining us from his podcast *Philosophy for the People*, interviewing Jim Madden, author of the chapter *Mere Hylomorphism and Neuroscience*. Enjoy.

Pat Flynn:

Professor Jim Madden has returned. Oh, dude, you already got the paperback.

Jim Madden:

They came today, man. They came today.

Pat Flynn:

Dude. Well, okay. Well, I guess the cat is out of the bag. We're going to be talking about this new volume. It's a very good new volume. I haven't read it all, but I've spent a good amount, because it's big and I just got it. But it's a book on, really, philosophy of mind. It's called *Minding the Brain*. You're looking at one of the contributors there, obviously the most handsome contributor, Professor Madden. Give us a little background of this project, Jim. I don't know when this episode airs, if they'll hear the other podcast. I am doing a couple episodes with some of the other contributors. I don't know how it will all line up. But anyways, just give us the background. How'd you get involved in this? What is it about?

Jim Madden:

Which contributors are you doing the show with?

Pat Flynn:

I think it is Dr. Angus Menuge.

I think Bob as well, Bob Marks. He's been on the show before. And I think Krouse, is that-

Jim Madden:

Yeah, Krouse.

Pat Flynn:

... the other editor?

Jim Madden:

Krouse is one of the editors. Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

Right. So there we go. Yeah, it would be broad stuff.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. I can't remember if I was contacted by Angus or Robert Krouse to do it. I think it was Angus. But I've had one order remove from Angus Menuge for a while in that he's professor of philosophy for a long time at Concordia University in Wisconsin in Mequon

Pat Flynn:

Oh, really?

Jim Madden:

Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

Not too far from here.

Jim Madden:

Well, I have the distinction of having been kicked out of my freshman year of college. And so there was a-

Pat Flynn:

That's why you're the maverick philosopher. You're the bad boy.

Jim Madden:

I had exceptionally good grades, but I remember the woman who was sort of the dean of students then, a very good woman. I remember her saying to me on my way out, like, "Jim, I think someday you're going to be a decent person, but we're not going to wait for you here at Concordia University to figure that out."

Pat Flynn:

What a great line.

Jim Madden:

Yeah, it's a great line. Yeah. I was able to contact her later in life and say, "Thank you. I think it worked out."

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Thanks, man.

Jim Madden:

"You really gave me much by this reminder." Okay. Yes. Sorry. Menuge, he wasn't there when I was there, but there was a guy who I had a world civ class with, but we read a bunch of classic stuff. The first one I read Plato was in this world civ class, and that really partly turned me on to philosophy. This guy named, I think he went by Reverend Ferry at the time. I think he became Dr. Ferry, and he eventually

was the longtime president of... Yeah. And so obviously he and Menuge were friends, and this is someone who was actually important to me in my development.

So anyway, I had had contact with Angus Menuge a couple of times throughout the career, and then when I heard he was editing this volume and they wanted me to do it, I was like, "Yeah, by all means, I'll throw something in."

I had this giant paper on hylomorphism that I wanted to be my last statement on hylomorphism before moving on to other stuff kind of already chambered. I wasn't sure what I was going to do with it because it was very big and probably too big for a journal, but big enough for an anthology, right?

Pat Flynn:

Right, so perfect. Yeah. Mm-hmm.

Jim Madden:

Yeah, so perfect. So I was like, boom. I didn't know it was the Discovery Institute or anything like that when I signed up for it. I just knew Angus was doing this. This is a guy I knew, guy I respected. We had mutual friends, so...I don't know much about the history of it, like where it came from, what moved them to put it together. I just got the email saying, "Would you happen to have something on the hylomorphism, son?" And I was like, "It's funny you asked."

Pat Flynn:

"I got just the thing."

Jim Madden:

"I've just got the thing for you, yeah."

Pat Flynn:

Yeah.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. That's all I know about where the volume came from. And I'll say this, it's an impressive volume. This is the first time I've seen the whole thing.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah, dude. I was impressed.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. The coverage on this is pretty interesting. I don't see it as necessarily a really good primer on philosophy of mind, but it's-

Pat Flynn:

Actually Menuge's contribution would be a nice thing to like assign to a-

Jim Madden:

Yeah. Maybe like that essay. His book, by the way, he has a book called, I want to call it Agents Under Fire. It came out early 2000s. It's a superb book.

Pat Flynn:

Okay. Yeah. I haven't read that one.

Jim Madden:

I remember reading it in the early 2000s. I was a fairly junior professor, and it was one of my... I always wanted to get back into philosophy of mind, and it was one of the early things I read that kind of really got me going back in that direction. But what I do see is if you want an overall anti-materialist case or a case that's showing you don't have to be a materialist to be someone who's taking on the science in a constructive way, I think this is very good full coverage of it, people that have done it.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Like I said, I haven't had time to read all the contributions, but there's a lot of representation in there. Obviously, you have people defending a kind of substance dualist perspective. You are making the case for making sense of hylomorphism. There's some idealists, I believe, in there. But then you also see specific arguments just for specific commitments. There's a development of James Ross's argument in there, actually, which as you know is I think one of the more creative and provocative and, I think, convincing.

Jim Madden:

Who wrote that one?

Pat Flynn:

People I have never heard of before. It's two authors. If you wouldn't mind looking it up real quick because I was not familiar with either of them. And Selmer Brinjord and Naveen Govin Darayulu. That cannot be the correct pronunciation.

Jim Madden:

What's the name of the paper? Oh, there you go.

Pat Flynn:

It's Mathematical Objects Are Nonphysical, So We Are Too. It'd be chapter 23. James Ross isn't in the title, but it is James Ross's argument developed. Yeah.

Jim Madden:

That's interesting. Yeah. I don't know them either. That's cool. I'll be having a look at that paper.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. It's cool. It's cool. Of course, I'm partial to a lot of James Ross's stuff anyway, so I'm obviously going to lean towards that. But we're not here to talk about that. We're here to talk about what you contributed to this volume.

We'll keep it basic because I want people to actually go and read it. But also, I know it's been a while since you've written it, so it's probably not totally fresh in your memory, and I know how hard it is to kind of dust the cobwebs off of something you wrote probably a year or two ago at this point. Give us some highlights, give us a sketch. Yeah.

Jim Madden:

I think the first draft of that thing I did is I wrote up, I had this joint kind of a, not tit-for-tat, just kind of a joint thing that they had me do with Mark Johnston at Princeton. I wrote up this big 35-40 page paper to get ready for that. And then I found out after the fact I was only going to have about 25 minutes to speak, so I had to put that aside, and that's the origin of this paper. It was like-

Pat Flynn:

Oh, cool.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. Anyway, so I call it Mere Hylomorphism, is the title of it. This comes from a period where I had kind of realized relatively late in life, mid-career, that I really wasn't that well-educated of a human being. I really came to worry that a lot of what I had done with a lot of classical philosophy had just been this sort of Thomistic cherry-picking, and then even what I was doing with maybe even Thomism was a kind of comfortable cherry-picking. I realized how well did I really understand the classic version of hylomorphism, like what we find. We've talked about this, but I sort of started over, really started over and went back and got really into De Anima and really into how it connects to the Metaphysics and really into how it connects to Nicomachean Ethics, and I didn't worry how does it connect with credal Catholicism? How does it connect with certain versions of Thomism? I still just put all that to the side. I just want to understand this and how does it work?

I think when looking back on Mind, Matter, and Nature, the first book I wrote on this, I think I was in a lot of ways still kind of trying to get a square peg in a round hole, maybe cherry-picking some stuff. I think that book still holds up for what it's supposed to be. I still think it's a very good book. If you wanted to be Thomist in light of contemporary philosophy of mind, this may well be the best way to do it. But the question of whether or not that is hylomorphism and that gives us the full strength of hylomorphism, I'm more open to the answer to that could be negative. And this paper is me trying to figure some of that out.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Yeah. What an honest disposition. Right?

Jim Madden:

Yeah. You know me. I'm not a proud man, Pat. Probably frustratingly so, for some.

Pat Flynn:

I was talking about this actually yesterday, Jim. I was talking about it with another Jim. I was talking about it with another Dr. Jim. We had Dr. Jim Jacobs on the show. I brought up the fact that, hey, Aristotle's ethics properly understood, it's not even really all that close to a Christian ethic, really. Not really. The attempt to sort of Christianize the dude or Christianize the Aristotelian picture is, I think, very contrived. And we shouldn't do that. We should just acknowledge the commonalities where there

actually are commonalities, and we should also just accept the radical divergence. And there's a lot of radical divergence. And I think that the divergence, actually, is quite good for the Christian because I think that Aristotle's ethics is severely deficient in some ways. It's sort of like the good life is something that happens to only three people that are in an aristocracy, more or less. Everyone else is kind of screwed.

Jim Madden:

Or you've got the good life for those three people, then you have the good life for the rest of the slaves, right?

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Right. That's kind of jarring. And hey, maybe that's right, but I don't think that... There's not really an Aristotelian optimism there. You know what I mean? Of course not. He was explicitly pessimistic sometimes. All to say, I agree with you, Jim. I agree with you in general, but you're obviously looking at this more in philosophy, not even philosophy of mind, but really philosophy of nature and that's sort of how you initially framed this paper, which I love, is you're like, "Hey, let's just back up from this use of philosophy of mind right now and just kind of understand what motivates hylomorphism in the first place," because it's not the interaction problem, for example. I think that positioning is hugely important. So if you wouldn't mind talking to us about it.

Jim Madden:

That's something I was claiming back in the first book, too. The thing to remember here is hylomorphism as... And what I mean by mere hylomorphism is a hylomorphism that I'm not a classicist. It could be Miserere Dei and all that, but it's a hylomorphism that we can actually connect to Aristotle. Gabe's like that's the "mere" part, but still is going to give us a view of things that we might be able to take seriously today, right?

Pat Flynn:

Yes. Good. Mm-hmm.

Jim Madden:

I think if you're going to say your hylomorphism connects with Aristotle, then you have to say it comes online. Its main motivation is the problem of change as it appears in the physics.

Pat Flynn:

Yes.

Jim Madden:

That is it, okay?

Pat Flynn:

Undeniably so.

Jim Madden:

Undeniably. Yeah. We can get into whether the order of the books really is the order of thinking for Aristotle, but whatever. For Aristotle, and I do riff on Mark Johnston in the paper on this quite a bit, the idea is if you're just taking any ordinary artifact like a desk, that desk is not identical to its parts. How do we know that? Because you could go Jimi Hendrix on that desk like on a guitar and smash that thing up and you have all the parts, but you wouldn't have the desk. So it's not identical to the parts. Moreover, we could change over piecemeal one piece at a time of the desk over time, and at no point would you say, "Aha, you stole my desk!" You would say the thing has got some sort of relation to the outside, so it can exchange parts and thereby it remains a desk, but it's not identical to any one collection of parts, right?

Pat Flynn:

Yes. Right.

Jim Madden:

If you go into Physics book two, these are the arguments he makes about what is the nature of a thing. Okay. It's not its matter; it's not its parts, as I put it in the paper. That's how I framed it the paper. It's not its parts. It's got to be something else, or it's got to be the parts in composition with something else. But I think when we make a mistake, and we all make this mistake and I think the English language lends itself to this mistake, is when I say it's the parts plus something else, we immediately think of it it's another part. There's like a special screw that goes in that desk that makes it a single desk. That is what it is. Or maybe it's a screw that you can't see. But here's the deal. If the whole point is how do we make sense of parts making a whole, a unity where the parts aren't sufficient for the unity, adding another discrete part to it is not going to do that.

Pat Flynn:

Yes. Obviously not. Right. Mm-hmm.

Jim Madden:

And it's important. But right there though, we've got to go with Aristotle and say "being is said in many ways." And I think we misunderstand hylomorphism when we think of everything that's going to enter our ontology now is a discrete, countable, concrete individual thing because that's not what a form is for Aristotle. It is not what a form is. And so Aristotle will tell you what is it that you need in addition to the parts for the desk, is you need an arrangement such that the desk does something that we would not ascribe merely to its parts. So for artifact, like a desk, it's going to be like, it's got to have now rest-ability. I can set my mug on it.

You see what the point here is, but that's where the matter-form distinction gets made. All the matter form, so what is the form of the desk? It's being ready to have things set on it. That's what the form of the desk is. It's ready for things to be set upon it. That's the form. So when you have parts arranged such that they have ready-to-accept resting things, it's a desk. All the soul matter, and I don't like soul-body distinction like Aristotle, I'd rather put it soul-matter distinction, is the application of that to living things.

Pat Flynn:

Right? Yes, exactly. Yep. Mm-hmm/

Jim Madden:

Okay. And so trigger alert for cat lovers coming up here. Okay, so-

Pat Flynn:

It's going to get a little gruesome. Right.

Jim Madden:

Right. You've probably heard me use this example, but if you take a cat and you throw it through a wood chipper, it will become brutally obvious that the cat is not identical to simply the collection of its parts because you'll have all the stuff on the far side of the wood chipper, but you won't have the cat.

Pat Flynn:

But no more Fluffy, right?

Jim Madden:

No more Fluffy. Fluffy's gone. Also, Fluffy's metabolic. So Fluffy's always exchanging parts with his environment. So he's not identical to his parts. So what is Fluffy? Fluffy is a matter, Aristotle would call it soul, but the soul is simply the form of a living thing. The way Aristotle defines soul in De Anima, when you finally get him to settle down in book two of De Anima and give you this definition, he says it is the first actualization, under Reeve's translation, "the first actualization of a living body." It's very important because a lot of us later will try to make that the first actualizer. That's not what Aristotle says, at least according to Reeve. It's the first actualization. So it's not like this form is this thing that comes up to some parts and does this actualizing-

Pat Flynn:

And then does this magic on it, right? Yeah.

Jim Madden:

Does this magic on it, right. His example in De Anima is if eyes were living organisms on their own, their soul would be sight. He says it's not seeing because when you close your eyes, you're not seeing, but they're still such that they are sighted. They're ready to go. They're ready to do the eye thing. That's important. So it's not like the soul of the eye, then, is something acting on the matter. It is the matter's readiness to do the eye business.

Pat Flynn:

Yes. Right. Good, good. Subtle, but good distinction.

Jim Madden:

Subtle. Yeah. But good. But now note, that that means Fluffy is an interesting thing because he's not identical to his parts now. Aristotle's not a dualist about anything, but he's not a materialist about anything either.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. And this is one of the themes of your paper, and I think it's right because hylomorphism gets accused of both. It's like, "Oh, you guys are really just dualists, right?" Or, "No, you guys are really just

materialists," and part of your very careful project here is to show why neither of those are actually correct representations of the view, right?

Jim Madden:

As Mark Johnston put it to me in conversation, I was like, the risk is either becoming just interactive dualism or a polite version of materialism.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah, polite materialism.

Jim Madden:

I like that idea of polite materialism. Materialism with good taste.

Pat Flynn:

Is there such a thing? Sorry to all my materialist friends, but... Right?

Jim Madden:

Materialism...

Pat Flynn:

Just be like me. I accept that I'm a crude brute. There's no such thing as a polite pat for it, and that's okay, right? Yeah.

Jim Madden:

Anyway, Aristotle even used the example, he says, "Look, if you smush the eye back to the eye jelly," his example, "you don't have sight anymore." The soul of the eye is done. He says, "If a hammer or if an ax were an organism, its soul would be its readiness to chop, and if you smash up the ax to bits, the readiness is gone." This is Aristotle really pressing to say he does not think souls are discrete individuals in the way that the things they are souls of are discrete individuals. I think that's very, very important. So that's one thing I really wanted to get out in this paper first is what is meant by soul there? It's like even given modern English, to call soul in Aristotle soul is kind of an equivocation given what people expect.

Pat Flynn:

Yes. Yeah, totally. Totally. Right. Uh-huh. People just think in contemporary, I guess, common language. I mean, people identify soul and mind a lot of times, and again-

Jim Madden:

Which it's not. Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

And that triggers Jim. You start doing that, oh, man, you want to set Jim off.

Jim Madden:

Set me off. Because look, there's things without minds. Like for Aristotle, tree's got a soul. Is it a living thing? Yeah. Is it a living thing identical with its parts? The only living thing that doesn't have this problem for him, Aristotle. Is the God.

Pat Flynn:

Is the God. Right. Yeah.

Jim Madden:

God. So the tree is not identical to its parts, and it does stuff on its own. So it's got a soul, but isn't mind in Aristotle's view. You see that. That's another thing we should note, too, is Aristotle will make a case for soul. Why does he distinguish between the substantial or the form of an accidental object like a desk and a soul in something like a cat?

What Aristotle will argue is the desk is entirely passive in its function. It's just sitting there waiting for things to be set upon it, and the only changes it's undergoing independently are simply the changes that would've undergone the wood or the screws composing it anyway. So all the desk really does outside of this waiting-to-be-set-upon is it is decomposing in the way wood decomposes, in the way metal decomposes. So it doesn't have any active powers over and above the powers of its parts. So he'll say a desk is an accidental being. It's really just an accident of its composing parts. It's got a kind of temporary unity because we can do things with it. But he admits it's all relative to our interests and stuff like that. Its principle is not internal to it. It's externally imposed on it.

Pat Flynn:

Right. And hence why it's an artifact, right? Yeah.

Jim Madden:

Yeah, yeah. But then the cat, the tree, he would say the elements, they have a thing they do that is not imposed on them by anything outside of them. So the cat, you get the emergence of powers in the cat that are not present in any sense.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Like novel systems-level properties.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. And Aristotle's mysterious how you get those out of that. That's not his point, but he's just saying cats reproduce; cats hunt; cats make me sneeze, all this stuff that their parts alone would not do. It's an emergent feature of the cat, and thereby the cat is something over and above the parts in a more robust sense than which the desk is.

Pat Flynn:

Than the desk, right.

Jim Madden:

He has a soul. That's what it's to be alive for him, is to have this sort of power over your own parts.

Pat Flynn:

Right. Yeah. Yeah. Of course, that's an obvious distinction. I think it's obvious. There's certainly borderline cases. Everybody likes to talk about styrofoam. That's what keeps me up at night.

Right. Right. But when it comes to a cat and a desk, yeah, it totally makes sense to have different classifications for these things precisely because of those sort of higher systems, emergent systems-level properties, right? Yeah.

Jim Madden:

Okay. Then something else really important for this paper for me is so what is it that the cat has to be ready to do in order for us to say you've got a living cat. Let's just say you've got a cat's soul going on there. I like to put it that way, like you've got soul going on. It's like a soul is in the view.

Pat Flynn:

It sounds like a, I don't know, an album.

Jim Madden:

It sounds like a Motown album from 1969.

Pat Flynn:

That's exactly right. Yeah.

Jim Madden:

Got soul going on.

Pat Flynn:

I was just laughing the other day because guess what just popped into my head? Bad, bad Leroy brown, man, just walking around.

Jim Madden:

That's right. Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

Dang. Dang it, Jim. This is what I have to deal with now.

Jim Madden:

Oh, man. If you get that in the docket for the band, I'm coming.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah, dude. Yeah. Let me put it right on the set list.

Jim Madden:

That's right. Anyway.

Pat Flynn:

Continue. Yeah. Just remember, listeners, you get what you pay for with this podcast.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. Right. I'm trying to bring this back now to center. Anyway, so...

Pat Flynn:

You got soul going. You got soul going on. That's what started it.

Jim Madden:

It's for Aristotle, there's no defining what the soul of a cat is outside of defining the point of flourishing for a cat. So the notion of cat happiness and the notion of a cat's soul are conceptually linked. And so what is it to be an actualized cat? It's to be disposed towards a certain point of cat flourishing, a good life for the cat. And so what is it to have a human soul? It's to be disposed toward the good life of a human being.

I think even if you look at the whole structure of the organism, it's all set up to get that thing into the good life of that kind of animal. Even post-Darwin, you can even say, "Well, the good life for it is just to make more of its own kind," or something like that. Fine. But you're going to say it's still to be a cat is to be disposed in that way. So once again, you're seeing the connection. You're like, if you want to talk soul for Aristotle, you've got to talk ethics now because you're going to have to bring in what is happiness. Do you see that?

Pat Flynn:

Right. Mm-hmm.

Jim Madden:

Okay. And also a lot of that stuff, I bring this all out in the paper, is you're not going to get any of that to work unless you bring in the act potency sections from the Metaphysics, too. Okay?

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Right. Mm-hmm.

Jim Madden:

All right. So then you look at the human soul. The human soul, what is it to have a human soul? Well, it is to be an organism that is configured in a way so that you're at-the-ready to do the human thing. Humans, I'm loose here, I'm ready to go. Just put me in a situation. Boom. That's how he thinks. Being in the right situation will trigger it.

So what's the human thing? Well, we've got all the vegetative stuff that the plants have. We've got the bodily stuff that the cats have or the sensitive stuff the cats have. But also suddenly we have this rational function, and Aristotle's quite impressed by that, and he thinks that, to say the least, he thinks that that rational function, when fully exercised, when actively exercised, only makes sense inasmuch as it has gained a sort of identity relationship with the God. In that sense, he would say the soul, the life of the human is in fact in a sense separable from bodily life because it's an involvement with something that is itself utterly separated from bodily life, the God, the one non-bodily thing for Aristotle, fully non-bodily is the God.

Aristotle thinks inasmuch as we are capable of this sort of rest in contemplation, we have a non-bodily state which then puts us in some sort of, I think he's really seeking some kind of identity relation with the God. Then how you make sense of that aspect of our lives in coherence with the other aspects of our lives, I don't know that anyone can make sense of that. If you read Aristotle's writings and his attempts to make sense of it, it's the thing he has the least to say about. If you get to De Anima, literally where he talks about separated intellect, it is a paragraph or two depending on how the translation breaks it up, and it's a half page. That's all you get. So I think Aristotle is saying, "I'm out of things to say about this."

Pat Flynn:

That's it, boys.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. Because he says all over the De Anima, he says, "Soul is not separable from matter. Soul is not separable from matter. Soul is not separated from matter. Guys, it's not separable." Then he starts saying, well, unless there's a function of the soul that the life, this thing has a part of its life that is non-bodily, maybe that's reason. But then he's like, "Yeah, but it seems like for us to do reason we got to have imagination." So he has these hedges throughout, and then he's like, "Yeah, it looks like that active intellect business is doing that." And then you get him, he says some very obscure things about it. He says, "We don't remember it," and then he goes to the next thing.

I actually like that, and I find myself very compelled by a paper that Elizabeth Anscombe wrote about this, where she says, "I agree that there is no bodily organ of thought, but that doesn't mean there's a non-bodily organ of thought. It might be that thought is just the sort of thing that you cannot identify with being identical to anything, and when we start to think about thinking, we've just run out of things that can be said." You see that. For Anscombe, that's as good as you're going to get because she is a very consistent Aristotelian too.

Pat Flynn:

She's great. You know I love her on everything.

Jim Madden:

I think that's where I've sort of finally landed on this.

Pat Flynn:

Mm-hmm.

Jim Madden:

Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. That's cool. Jim, that was great, man. I'm totally satisfied is that the sort of introduction tohylomorphism, and obviously there's a lot more in the paper. You do talk about relations to contemporary neuroscience, but people can read the paper for that.

Jim Madden:

Some other very odd things that Aristotle says, I think it's in the Metaphysics, just the passage I use here about how he thinks you can locate the primary place of the soul in the body. Just pretty funky. Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. Good stuff, man. All right. Hold the book up one more time so people can see it. I want to encourage them to grab a copy of that. If you guys are interested in philosophy of mind, I really do highly recommend this book. It's called Minding the Brain. It's already out. It's officially released. You can find it at the usual places, Amazon and whatnot. I'm very impressed with what I've read so far. It's great to see Jim contributing in another volume. If you guys haven't read any of Jim's published work, that's insulting, right?

Jim Madden:

Yeah.

Pat Flynn:

Frankly, frankly. So go do that.

Jim Madden:

It would be good for the listeners to go read something where I'm not just completely screwing around.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah. You are a pro and you do really great work, and I want to make sure people get to benefit from that. So as goofy as we are here, I've always benefited from a lot of your work and I appreciate what you do. Really.

Jim Madden:

Yeah. I'm proud of that paper. I'll say that. Maybe I shouldn't say it, but I am proud of that paper. I'm not saying it's the end-all be-all, but it's a paper where you're going to get Robert Brando and Aristotle and even some Merleau-Ponty stuff in the same conversation along with neuroscience. So it's a good representative of where I've landed on things.

Pat Flynn:

Yeah, absolutely. All right, Jim. Listeners, check it out. Give us your thoughts and comments below. Please like and subscribe to the podcast. We'll get you next time. See you.

Announcer:

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